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ABSTRACT
The development of positioning technologies has resulted in an
increasing amount of mobility data being available. While bringing
a lot of convenience to people’s life, such availability also raises
serious concerns about privacy. In this paper, we concentrate on
one of the most sensitive information that can be inferred from mo-
bility data, namely social relationships. We propose a novel social
relation inference attack that relies on an advanced feature learn-
ing technique to automatically summarize users’ mobility features.
Compared to existing approaches, our attack is able to predict any
two individuals’ social relation, and it does not require the adver-
sary to have any prior knowledge on existing social relations. These
advantages significantly increase the applicability of our attack and
the scope of the privacy assessment. Extensive experiments con-
ducted on a large dataset demonstrate that our inference attack is
effective, and achieves between 13% to 20% improvement over the
best state-of-the-art scheme. We propose three defense mechanisms
– hiding, replacement and generalization – and evaluate their effec-
tiveness for mitigating the social link privacy risks stemming from
mobility data sharing. Our experimental results show that both
hiding and replacement mechanisms outperform generalization.
Moreover, hiding and replacement achieve a comparable trade-off
between utility and privacy, the former preserving better utility
and the latter providing better privacy.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the widespread usage of portable devices, mobility data has
become available to a plethora of service providers, such as telecom-
munication operators, credit card companies, location-based ser-
vices and online social networks (OSNs). While substantially im-
proving mobile users’ experience and providing them with con-
venient services, e.g., location recommendation, such availability
also raises serious concerns about privacy. Previous studies have
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shown that a user’s mobility trace is higly unique [28] and can be
effectively deanonymized [39] with side channel information, and
that a user’s location data can unveil his personal attributes [32]
and identity [16].
Social relationships represent highly privacy-sensitive informa-
tion that is deeply connected with our social identity [10, 27]. In
practice, online social network users have realized the extent of
this threat and increasingly concealed their social relationships.
For instance, the percentage of Facebook users in New York hiding
their friend lists increased from 17.2% in 2010 to 56.2% in 2011 [11].
However, many individuals do not yet realize that their mobility
data can also unveil their social relationships. Using location data
to infer the underlying social relations between mobile users is of
particular interest to various adversarial parties getting access to
mobility data but not to social relations. For example, it is now well
known that the NSA collects location and travel habit data to find
unknown associates of targets it already knows about [1].
Previous works [5, 10, 35, 37, 42, 44] have demonstrated that
mobility data can indeed serve as a strong predictor for inferring
social relationships. However, these studies are all conducted with
a data-mining perspective, e.g., for recommending friends to users
in OSNs. They notably impose several requirements on the mobility
data needed to infer social links, which dramatically reduces the
scope of their applicability. For instance, almost all existing effective
methods can only be applied if two individuals share locations
in common. However, from a privacy point of view, in order to
fully assess the extent to which location data can reveal the social
relationships of any possible user, no such requirement should be
a priori imposed. Moreover, no mitigation techniques have been
proposed and evaluated so far for countering potential adversarial
social link inference. This paper aims at filling these two essential
gaps. First, the link prediction system must be as generic as possible
to be able to evaluate, for any possible mobile user, the extent of
the privacy risk towards his social links. Second, it is of utmost
importance to design effective defense mechanisms for reducing the
inherent risk towards social link privacy in location-data sharing.
Inference attack. Our link inference attack aims at predicting
whether any pair of individuals are socially related, regardless of
whether they have shared any common locations before. The attack
relies on constructing an informative mobility profile/features for
each user, and comparing two users’ profiles, with the assumption
that the mobility profiles of friends should be more similar than
the profiles of strangers. However, manually constructing mobil-
ity features normally involves tedious efforts and domain experts’
knowledge. Instead, we rely on an advanced feature learning model
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(based on neural networks) to automatically learn each user’s mo-
bility features. The feature learning method we adopt [25, 26] is
able to preserve a user’smobility neighbors, containing the locations
he has visited, and the other users who have visited these locations.
This method assumes that a user’s mobility neighbors represent
his mobility features to a large extent. After each user’s mobility
features are learned, we utilize pairwise similarity measures to com-
pare two users’ features and infer if these users are socially related.
As our inference technique is unsupervised, the adversary does not
need any prior knowledge on existing social relationships, which
broadens the range of scenarios our attack can cover.
We empirically evaluate our inference attack on a large-scale
dataset containing millions of location data points, i.e., check-ins,
shared by Instagram users. Compared to well-known mobility
datasets containing social relationships [8, 9], our dataset notably
includes detailed information about each location, such as the loca-
tion category/semantics. Extensive experimental evaluation shows
that our attack is effective (with an area under the ROC curve equal
to 0.8), and achieves between 13% to 20% improvement over the
previous methods. We also empirically study the impact on the per-
formance of various parameters involved in our machine-learning
model. Then, we demonstrate that our attack is robust when a user
only shares a small number of locations (down to 5 check-ins), and
can even identify relationships between pairs of users that have
shared no common location. Finally, we show that our attack is also
effective when the adversary only has access to coarser-grained
mobility data.
Countermeasures. In order to mitigate the aforementioned pri-
vacy risks, we extend and evaluate three defense mechanisms ini-
tially proposed by the location privacy community [6, 38]: hiding,
replacement and generalization. In particular, for the replacement
mechanism, we rely on the random walk approach proposed in [27]
to find socially close locations to be replaced with. For generaliza-
tion, we use two levels of generalization for both the semantic and
geographical dimensions [6]. For the inference attack carried out
with this countermeasure, we consider an enhanced adversary who
is equipped with background knowledge on each location’s pop-
ularity. This allows us to evaluate the generalization mechanism
under a realistic setting, and thus have a more meaningful pri-
vacy assessment. We evaluate the effectiveness of the three defense
mechanisms on our inference attack as well as on the previously
proposed inference methods.
To quantify the utility degradation resulting from our mitigation
techniques, we adopt an information-theoretic metric, the Jensen-
Shannon divergence, which measures the difference between each
user’s location distribution in the original and in the obfuscated
dataset. This utility measurement is meaningful since a user’s lo-
cation distribution is an essential element for building useful ap-
plications from mobility data, such as location recommendation
systems.
Our experimental results show that hiding and replacement
achieve equivalent privacy-utility trade-off: the former preserves
better utility but the latter can reduce the attack’s performance to
a larger extent. Furthermore, both hiding and replacement signifi-
cantly outperform the generalization mechanism.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contributions.
• We propose a new social relation inference attack based on
mobility data. The attack relies on a feature learning method
and is able to predict any two users’ social relationship re-
gardless of whether they have visited common locations.
This allows us to comprehensively evaluate the social link
privacy risks stemming from location sharing.
• Extensive experiments demonstrate that our attack signifi-
cantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, and that it is
robust to different real-world conditions, including a small
number of available location data points.
• We propose the first defense mechanisms for protecting
social link privacy from mobility-based attacks, and experi-
mentally demonstrate their effectiveness.
Organization. Section 2 presents the notations and the adversary
model considered in this paper. Our inference attack and its evalua-
tion are presented in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, we
introduce the defense mechanisms and their evaluation. Section 6
presents related work. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 MODEL
In this section, we introduce the notations used throughout the
paper, as well as the adversary model.
2.1 User Model
We typically denote a user by u ∈ U and a location by ℓ ∈ L with
U and L representing the sets of users and locations, respectively.
Note that each location considered in this paper is mapped to a
fine-grained point of interest (POI), such as MoMA in New York.
A user u visiting a location ℓ is referred to as a check-in denoted
by a tuple ⟨u, t , ℓ⟩, where t is the time when the check-in happens.
We define τ (u, ℓ) as the set of all the check-ins of u at ℓ, and τ (u)
as the set of u’s check-ins in the dataset. Moreover, ω(u) is used to
denote all the locations u has been to.
2.2 Adversary model
The adversary’s objective is to infer the social links, or relation-
ships, between users by merely observing their mobility data. More
precisely, he wants to infer whether two individuals are socially
related or not, that is, make a binary prediction on the existence
of a social link between two users. Such adversary can typically
represent some location-based services, such as telecommunication
operators, credit card companies and mobile apps on smart phones,
that collect users’ data without having access to their social graph.
It can also model an OSN user who has access to someone’s loca-
tion check-ins but not his social link information. This is possible on
Facebook where a user can choose to hide his friends list, but keep
other information, such as location check-ins, public. Our attack
could be used by attackers to learn social links in order to further
deanonymize users of the social network(s) [29]. Finally, it can also
represent a global intelligence agency that gets access to mobility
patterns of citizens through their mobile phones’ metadata [1].
Random
walk Skip-gram
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Figure 1: Social link inference attack based on location data: a schematic overview.
3 SOCIAL LINK INFERENCE ATTACK
To infer two users’ social relationship with mobility data, one ap-
proach would be to design informative features based on the com-
mon locations they have visited,1 as proposed in the state-of-the-art
works [35, 37, 42]. However, as shown in Section 4, more than 50%
user pairs do not share any common locations, meaning that such
approaches cannot be applied to infer their social relationships.
Alternatively, we can summarize each user’s mobility features (or
profile), then compare two users’ features to predict their social
link, with the assumption that friends have more similar mobility
profiles than strangers. This approach enables the adversary to
predict any pair of users’ social link. However, defining informative
mobility features is a non-trivial task because it falls into the do-
main of feature engineering in machine learning, which normally
involves tedious efforts and domain experts’ knowledge. For in-
stance, features such as users’ home locations, as proposed in [37],
have led to poor inference performance (see Section 4).
The recent advancement of representation/feature learning (deep
learning) provides us with an alternative approach. In this setting,
features are automatically learned following an objective function
that is independent from the downstream prediction task, in our
case, social link inference. Promising works in this field include [15,
34, 40], whose objective functions preserve each user’s neighbor
information in the social network. The assumption of these works
is that a user’s social neighbors can reflect who he is. Similarly, we
believe that a user’s mobility neighbors can summarize his mobility
profile to a large extent. Therefore, we utilize feature learning to
automatically learn each user’s mobility features, and apply the
learned features for social relation inference.
Our attack can be decomposed into three stages, as depicted
schematically in Figure 1. In the first stage, we adopt a random walk
approach on the user-location bipartite graph to obtain random
walk traces, which represent each user’s neighbors in the mobility
context. In the second stage, we feed the obtained random walk
traces to a state-of-the-art feature learning model, namely skip-
gram [25, 26], to obtain each user’s mobility features in a continuous
1Two users sharing a common location indicates that they have both visited the
location, regardless of time.
vector space. In the third stage, we measure the pairwise similarity
between two users’ vectors to predict whether there exists a social
link between them in an unsupervised setting.
3.1 Mobility Neighbors with RandomWalk
We organize users and locations into a weighted bipartite graph
G = (U,L, E) where E ⊆ U × L contains all the edges between
U and L. For an edge (u, ℓ) ∈ E between u and ℓ, we define
its edge weight wu, ℓ as the number of check-ins of u at ℓ, i.e.,
wu, ℓ = |τ (u, ℓ)|. A user’s graph neighbors in the mobility context
should contain locations he has been to, especially those locations
he frequently visits, but also indirect neighbors such as other users
who have visited the same locations, locations these users have
visited, and so on. It is worth noting that this representation has
demonstrated its effectiveness in numerous real-world applications,
such as recommendation systems.
To define a user’s mobility neighbors, we could rely on breadth-
first sampling (BFS) or depth-first sampling (DFS) [15]. However,
the neighbors resulting from BFS and DFS cannot reflect properly
the user’s top visited locations and other users that are similar to
him, as the number of times a user visited a location is not taken
into account. The random walk method fits our problem better, as it
considers edge weights and is computationally more efficient than
the aforementioned approaches [15]. Previously, the random walk
approach has been demonstrated to be effective on homogeneous
networks, such as social networks, to define a node’s neighbors for
feature learning [15, 34]. We generalize it to bipartite graphs in this
work.
We denote a randomwalk trace by ϕ, which is composed of users
and locations and a set Φ contains all the random walk traces. The
procedure for generating random walk traces from a user-location
bipartite graph is listed in Algorithm 1. For each user, the algorithm
generates tw random walk traces (Line 3), and each trace is lw steps
long (Line 6). Here, tw and lw , referred aswalk times andwalk length,
are two hyperparameters and their values are set experimentally.
For each current node curr_v in a random walk trace, we extract
its neighbors, i.e., curr_v_nb, from G and the corresponding edge
weights from curr_v to curr_v_nb, i.e., curr_v_w (Line 7). Then, the
Algorithm 1: Generating random walk traces
Data: A user-location bipartite graph G = (U,L, E)
Result: Random walk traces Φ
1 Φ← [ ];
2 for u ∈ U do
3 for i = 1 to tw do
4 ϕ ← [u];
5 curr_v ← u;
6 for j = 2 to lw do
7 curr_v_nb, curr_v_w ← GetNb(curr_v,G);
8 # extract curr_v’s neighbors (curr_v_nb)
9 and the corresponding weights (curr_v_w);
10 next_v ← Sampling(curr_v_nb, curr_v_w);
11 append next_v to ϕ;
12 curr_v ← next_v;
13 end
14 append ϕ to Φ;
15 end
16 end
next nodenext_v in the randomwalk given the current node curr_v
is chosen with the alias method [41] according to the following
transition probability:
P(next_v=y |curr_v=x)=

wx,y
Z if x ∈ U ∧ (x ,y) ∈ E,
wy,x
Z if x ∈ L ∧ (y,x) ∈ E,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where Z is the normalizing constant equal to the sum of the edge
weights connected to x (Line 9). In the end, we obtain Φ which
contains |U| × tw random walk traces and each trace is lw steps
long. The mobility neighbors of a user u, denoted by N (u), are the
nodes precedent and after u in all the random walk traces Φ.
3.2 Skip-Gram Model
In the second stage of our inference attack, we feed the random
walk traces Φ into the skip-gram model to map each user’s mobility
information into a continuous vector. The model outputs one vec-
tor per user, which represents his mobility features. Skip-gram is a
(shallow) neural network with one hidden layer that preserves a
user’s graph neighborhood information. Two users sharing similar
mobility neighbors will be closer in the vector space (have simi-
lar mobility features) under skip-gram, which makes this model
suitable for our prediction task.
The objective function of skip-gram is formalized as follows:
argmax
θ ∈R|U∪L|×d
∏
v ∈U∪L
p(N (v)|v ;θ ) (2)
where θ represents the parameters of the model, i.e., the vectors
(features) of all nodes in G, and d is the dimension of the learned
vectors. Similar to the walk times tw and walk length lw in the first
stage, d is also a hyperparameter that we will study in Section 4. As
we can see from objective function 2, skip-gram uses each node to
predict its neighbor nodes in Φ. Next, by assuming that predicting
neighbor nodes are independent of each other, objective 2 can be
factorized into:
argmax
θ ∈R|U∪L|×d
∏
v ∈U∪L
∏
n∈N (v)
p(n |v ;θ ). (3)
The conditional probability p(n |v;θ ) is modeled with a softmax
function:
p(n |v ;θ ) = e
θ (n)·θ (v)∑
m∈U∪L
eθ (m)·θ (v)
(4)
where θ (v) ∈ Rd is the vector we aim to obtain forv and θ (n) ·θ (v)
is the dot product of the two vectors.
By plugging softmax into objective function 3 and applying log-
likelihood transformation, skip-gram is turned into:
argmax
θ ∈R|U∪L|×d
∑
v ∈U∪L
∑
n∈N (v)
(
θ (n)·θ (v)−log
∑
m∈U∪L
eθ (m)·θ (v)
)
. (5)
From objective function 5, we can observe that if two nodes share
similar neighbors, then their vectors will be similar. However, due
to the term log
∑
m∈U∪L
eθ (m)·θ (v), solving objective function 5 is
computationally expensive since it requires summation over all
nodes in G. In order to speed up the learning process, we adopt the
negative sampling approach [26].
The negative sampling approach targets a different objective
than the original skip-gram model, which is whether two nodes n
and v appear together in a random walk trace or not: n ∈ N (v) or
n < N (v). It is easy to see that this objective can be interpreted as a
binary classification, and we use a random variable ∆ to describe
the binary choice: ∆ = 1 if two nodes appear together in any trace
in Φ, and ∆ = 0 otherwise. Then, the new objective function of
skip-gram is:
argmax
θ ∈R|U∪L|×d
∏
v ∈U∪L
∏
n∈N (v)
p(∆ = 1 | n,v ;θ )·∏
v ∈U∪L
∏
n∈N (v)′
p(∆ = 0 | n,v ;θ ),
(6)
where N (v)′ is a sampled set that contains nodes which are not the
neighbors of v in Φ.2 The conditional probability p(∆ | n,v ;θ ) now
is modeled as the binary version of softmax, i.e., logistic regression,
which is denoted by:
p(∆ | n,v ;θ ) =
{ 1
1+e−θ (n)·θ (v ) if ∆ = 1,
1
1+eθ (n)·θ (v ) if ∆ = 0.
(7)
By adding all the pieces together, we have the following objective
function for skip-gram:
argmax
θ ∈R|U∪L|×d
∑
v ∈U∪L
∑
n∈N (v)
log 1
1 + e−θ (n)·θ (v)
+
∑
v ∈U∪L
∑
n∈N (v)′
log 1
1 + eθ (n)·θ (v)
.
(8)
Compared to objective function 5, which is a multi-label classifi-
cation, objective function 8 is more efficient to compute. We apply
stochastic gradient descend (SGD) in our experiments to solve it,
2We adopt the same method as in [26] to sample non-neighbors.
which eventually outputs the feature vectors of all the users in the
dataset.3
3.3 Social Link Prediction
In the last stage, for each pair of users u and v whose social link
we aim to predict, we adopt a pairwise similarity measurement s to
compare their feature vectors learned through skip-gram. We de-
cide that u and v are socially related if their similarity s(θ (u),θ (v))
is above a given threshold. We experimentally compare the effec-
tiveness of various similarity measurements in Section 4.
To the best of our knowledge, our attack is the first to utilize pair-
wise similarity metrics to infer two users’ social relation based on
skip-gram learned vectors. It is also worth noting that the existing
feature learning methods [15, 34, 40] focus on user-specific predic-
tion tasks, such as user attribute inference, and rely on supervised
learning algorithms.
3.4 Advantages of Our Approach
There are three main advantages of our link inference attack. First,
our attack is performed in an unsupervised setting, i.e., the adver-
sary does not need any prior knowledge about any existing social
relationships among the users. Second, our method can be applied
to predict a social link between any pair of users without requiring
them to share common locations. Both of these advantages result in
our attack being more generic and applicable to large-scale privacy
assessment than previous works. Third, our attack outperforms
state-of-the-art attacks significantly, as shown in the next section.
4 ATTACK EVALUATION
We evaluate our proposed social link inference attack in this sec-
tion. We first describe our experimental setup, including dataset,
evaluation metric, baseline models and parameter setting. Then, we
present the general results for the inference, and experimentally
study the sensitivity of the hyperparameters involved in our infer-
ence attack. Next, we evaluate the robustness of our attack with
respect to the number of check-ins a user shares, and the number
of common locations between two users. Finally, we assess the
performance of our attack when the adversary only has access to
coarse-grained location information.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Dataset. Since we need social relationships to be explicitly dis-
closed to construct our ground truth, we rely on OSN data to con-
duct our evaluation. Among all the OSNs, we chose Instagram for
two reasons. First, Instagram is the second largest social network
with a fast growing number of users, and its users are more likely
to share check-ins than other OSNs’. For instance, Instagram users
share 31 times more their locations than Twitter users [22]. Second,
Instagram’s location service is linked with Foursquare, a popular
location-based social network, which allows us to collect detailed
information about each location such as its name and category. In
particular, the location category information serves as the basis for
one of the defense mechanisms, namely generalization, which will
be presented in Section 5.
3Besides users’ vectors, we also obtain locations’ vectors. As we want to predict users’
social links, the location vectors are simply dropped.
Table 1: Statistics of the pre-processed dataset.
New York Los Angeles London
No. check-ins 1,843,187 1,301,991 500,776
No. locations 25,868 22,260 10,693
No. users 44,371 30,679 13,187
No. social links 193,995 129,004 25,413
The data collection was conducted in January 2016. We concen-
trate on three major English-speaking cities worldwide: New York,
Los Angeles and London. In the first step, we use Foursquare’s
API to collect all the Foursquare’s location IDs in these cities, to-
gether with these locations’ category information. Then, we use
Instagram’s API to transform Foursquare’s location IDs to the corre-
sponding Instagram’s location IDs.4 In the end, we use Instagram’s
API to extract all the users’ check-ins at each location in 2015. In
total, 6.3 million check-ins are collected in New York, 4.6 million
check-ins in Los Angeles and 2.9 million check-ins in London. Fur-
thermore, the dataset includes 35,389 different locations in New
York, 31,991 locations in Los Angeles, and 16,802 locations in Lon-
don. Each check-in is organized in the following form:
⟨userID, time, latitude, longitude, locationID, category⟩.
To collect the ground truth, i.e., the social network data, we
utilize Instagram’s API to collect all the IDs for the followees of the
users in the check-in dataset.5 As inmany previous works [9, 12, 19],
we consider two users to have a social relation if they mutually
follow each other.
Compared to the well-known mobility datasets containing ex-
plicit social relation information collected from Gowalla [9] and
Twitter [8], our dataset has two advantages. First, our dataset has
a denser volume. We collected more than 13 million check-ins
in only three cities, while the Gowalla dataset contains 6 million
and the Twitter dataset contains 22 million check-ins in the whole
world. Second, as mentioned above, our dataset contains detailed
information about each location, which both Gowalla and Twitter
datasets do not. For reproducibility purposes, the dataset will be
made available upon request.
In order to get a representative yet usable dataset, we perform
some pre-processing on the collected data. First, since accounts that
share many check-ins at one location are generally local businesses,
such as restaurants, we filter out users who have not visited at least
two different locations. Second, some accounts in Instagram are
celebrities or bots who are not the targets of our inference attack,
therefore, we filter out those whose numbers of followers6 are
above the 90th percentile (celebrities) or below the 10th percentile
(bots). Third, to resolve data sparseness issues, we run most of
our experiments on users with at least 20 check-ins, whom we
consider to be active users. This is in line with existing works such
as [7, 9, 42, 43]. However, as there is no standard rule for defining
4The connection between Instagram’s API and Foursquare’s API was aborted in April
2016 (https://www.instagram.com/developer/changelog/).
5We only collect each user’s followees not followers for efficiency reasons: some users
in Instagram have millions of followers, such as celebrities, and Instagram’s API only
returns 50 followers per request.
6 We use Instagram’s API to collect each user’s number of followers without collecting
the detailed follower list.
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Figure 2: (a) Distribution of the number of common locations between any two randomly chosen users and two socially related
users (friends); (b) Area under the ROC curve (AUC) with respect to various pairwise similarity measures; (c) ROC curves with
cosine similarity.
active users (≥ 20 check-ins in our case), we also study how filtering
based on a smaller number of check-ins (down to 5) influences the
inference attack’s performance in Subsection 4.4. The statistics of
our pre-processed dataset is listed in Table 1.
Metric.We adopt AUC (area under the ROC curve) as our attack
evaluation metric for two reasons. First, due to the nature of social
networks, link inference has a huge prediction space and the labels
are highly imbalanced, e.g., there are more than 9.8 billion pairs of
active users in New York and less than 0.02% of them are friends
(Table 1). To tackle this problem, we adopt the down-sampling
strategy used in [15, 21], that is, we randomly sample the same
number of stranger pairs as the number of friend pairs. To properly
evaluate the inference in the down-sampled prediction space, a
metric that is not sensitive to the label distribution is needed. As
pointed out in [21, 24], AUC satisfies this requirement, and previous
inference algorithms [15, 37, 42] have adopted it for evaluation too.
Second, there exists a conventional standard for interpreting AUC
(whose range is [0.5, 1]): 0.5 is equivalent to random guessing, 1 is
perfect guessing (100% true positives and no false positives), and 0.8
represents already a good prediction.7 This allows us to intuitively
get a sense of the attack’s performance, even without comparing
against baseline models. Finally, note that privacy is defined as the
opposite of the attack success. This means that privacy is minimal
when AUC equals 1, and maximal when AUC equals 0.5.
Baseline models. We consider 14 baseline models proposed in
three state-of-the-art papers inferring social relationships with
mobility data [35, 37, 42]. They are denoted by common_p [35],
overlap_p [35], w_common_p [35], w_overlap_p [35], aa_ent [35],
min_ent [35], aa_p [35], min_p [35], geodist [35], w_geodist [35],
pp [35], diversity [37], w_frequency [37, 42] and personal [42].
The formal definitions of these baseline models can be found in
their original papers. Each of the baseline models rely on manually-
designed features, thus can be evaluated in an unsupervised setting
as well.
Among all the baseline models, 7 of them (aa_ent, min_ent,
aa_p, min_p, diversity, w_frequency and personal) require that
7http://gim.unmc.edu/dxtests/roc3.htm
two users share at least one common location, in order to infer
whether there is a social link between them or not. However, Fig-
ure 2a shows that more than half of the active user pairs and around
30% of friends’ pairs do not share any common locations in each
city. Therefore, to evaluate these 7 baselines, we first apply them
on pairs of users who share at least one location, then randomly
guess the rest of the pairs’ social relationships.8
Parameter settings. As presented in Section 3, our model mainly
involves three hyperparameters: walk length lw , walk times tw
and feature vectors’ dimension d . We set their default values to
lw = 100, tw = 20 and d = 128. and evaluate how different values
affect the attack performance in Section 4.3. Another parameter is
the size of the neighbor nodes in the randomwalk traces, i.e., |N (v)|.
Following [15, 34], we set it to 20, considering 10 nodes preceding
and 10 nodes after v in Φ. Finally, the learning rate for SGD is
set to 0.025. The source code of our implementation is available
at https://github.com/yangzhangalmo/walk2friends.
4.2 Social Link Inference
Our social link inference attack relies on the pairwise similarity
between two users’ mobility features learned by the skip-gram
model. We have evaluated 7 common distance or similarity mea-
sures:9 cosine similarity, Euclidean distance, correlation coefficient,
Chebyshev distance, Bray-Curtis distance, Canberra distance, and
Manhattan distance. The corresponding AUC values are depicted
in Figure 2b. Among these measures, cosine similarity, correlation
coefficient and Bray-Curtis distance achieve the best performance
with AUC near 0.8, which represents a good prediction result. On
the other hand, Chebyshev distance performs the worst with AUC
around 0.6. By looking into all the similarity measures’ definition,
we notice that the best performing ones are those whose values are
bounded. For instance, correlation coefficient lies within the range
[-1, 1]. This indicates that bounded similarity measures provide
better results for link prediction based on mobility data.
8 The use of random guessing is due to the fact that our prediction is conducted in the
down-sampled space.
9 The formal definitions of these distances are in Appendix A.1.
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Figure 3: Comparison of our attack against baseline models: (a) using all users, (b) using only pairs of users who share at least
one common location.
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Figure 4: Influence of parameters (a) walk length, (b) walk times and (c) dimension of feature vectors on the inference perfor-
mance.
As cosine similarity maximizes the attack success, we use it
for our inference attack in the rest of this work. Figure 2c shows
the ROC curves corresponding to the cosine similarity’s AUCs in
Figure 2b. The inference performs slightly better for Los Angeles
than for New York or London with the true positive rate being
0.8 while the false positive rate staying at 0.34. The threshold at
this point is equal to 0.86, i.e., inferring user pairs whose features’
cosine similarity is above 0.86 as friends leads to a good prediction.
We then compare our inference attack against all the baseline
models, Figure 3a shows that our attack outperforms all the baseline
models significantly. For the best performing baseline model, i.e.,
w_common_p, we achieve a 20% performance gain in Los Angeles,
and a 17% gain in New York. In the worst case, i.e., London, the
performance gain is still 13%. This shows that our attack is much
more effective than the existing state-of-the-art attacks.
As discussed before, 7 baseline models can only be applied to
pairs of users who share common locations. We further compare
our attack against them (as well as the other baselines) on pairs of
users with at least one common location. Figure 3b shows that these
baselines’ performances indeed increase as reported in the original
papers, but our prediction still outperforms the best baseline model,
in this case min_ent, by 9% in Los Angeles, 5% in New York and
7% in London. By taking into account the fact that our attack can
predict any pair of users’ social link, this further demonstrates the
effectiveness of our attack.
4.3 Parameter Sensitivity
Next, we examine how the different choices of the three hyper-
parameters walk length (lw ), walk times (tw ) and dimension of
feature vectors (d) affect our attack performance. When testing
each parameter, the two remaining ones are kept to their default
settings, i.e., lw = 100, tw = 20 and d = 128.
Among all the three hyperparameters, lw and tw are directly
linked with the size of the random walk traces, i.e., the amount of
data being fed into skip-gram. Intuitively, larger values of lw and tw
should lead to better inference performance. This is indeed the case
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Figure 5: Evolution of the attack performance with respect to (a) the minimal number of check-ins shared by every user, (b)
the number of common locations two users share and (c) different granularities of the geographic grids.
as shown in Figures 4a and 4b. The AUC values in all three cities
increase sharply when lw increases from 10 to 50, and saturates
afterwards. Similarly, increasing tw from 2 to 10 leads to around
5% performance gain in all the cities.
The effect of the vector dimension (d), on the other hand, is
more subtle. Previous studies [15, 26, 34] have shown that larger d
results in better performance on node-level prediction. However,
the last stage of our inference attack relies on measuring two vec-
tors’ pairwise similarity, in this case longer vectors do not always
yield better performance, as observed in other data domains such
as biomedical data [3]. As depicted in Figure 4c, AUC is rather
stable when increasing d compared to lw and tw , especially for Los
Angeles: regardless of the choice of d , AUC stays around 0.80. In
conclusion, our default hyperparameter settings are suitable for
our inference attack.
4.4 Attack Robustness
Number of check-ins. As discussed above, our inference attacks
are performed on active users, i.e., users with at least 20 check-ins
in each city. This is in line with the existing works on social relation
inference attacks and mining user check-ins in general. However,
the optimal definition for active users, i.e., how many check-ins
a user should at least share, is not clear. The authors of [9] use
10, [43] uses 40, and [42] uses the top 5,000 users with the most
check-ins. To demonstrate that our attack’s performance is robust
under all circumstances, we further study the different choices for
defining active users with respect to AUC.
Figure 5a shows that, as we increase the minimum number of
check-ins, AUC increases almost linearly, especially for New York
and Los Angeles. This is expected since the more check-ins a user
shares, the more accurately the adversary can profile his mobility,
which in turn leads to a better social relation inference. More impor-
tantly, even when concentrating on users with at least 5 check-ins,
our inference attack still achieves a strong performance, e.g., AUC
is near 0.75 in Los Angeles. This indicates that our model can ef-
fectively infer a large number of individuals’ social links, and it
shows the extent of the privacy threat carried by mobility data at
a large scale. We also discover that the performance differences
between our attack and the best baseline models are consistent
under different active user definition. These results demonstrate
the robustness of our inference attack.
Number of common locations. One of the major advantages of
our inference attack is that it can predict any two individuals’ social
relationship regardless of whether they share common locations.
Nevertheless, we expect that two users sharing many locations in
common will be more likely to be socially related than two users
sharing none. Therefore, we evaluate here how our inference attack
performs with respect to the number of locations users have in
common. Recall that, by common location, we mean any location
where two users have checked in, not necessarily at the same time.
We select a subset of pairs of users who share between 0 and 4
locations in common, which includes the vast majority of pairs of
users (see Figure 2a), and show the results by number of common
locations, in Figure 5b . We observe that the inference performance
increases monotically with the number of common locations be-
tween two users. However, even when two users share no common
locations, our inference attack can still predict social links with
fair performance (AUC around 0.7), especially for New York and
Los Angeles (AUC equal to 0.72). This is essentially due to the fact
that our inference attack takes mobility neighborhood into account.
With a random walk method, a user’s mobility neighbors not only
consist of locations he visits but also of users who visit the same
locations as him and the locations these users visit. This enables to
establish a connection between users sharing no common locations.
It is worth noting that our inference attack performs much better
than baselines when there is no common location available between
users. Indeed, the most effective baselines have AUCs close to 0.5
(equivalent to random guessing) when two users share no location
in common.
4.5 Attack with Geographical Grids
So far, our attack has been performed on fine-grained mobility data,
i.e., check-ins at POIs. However, in some cases, the adversary may
not have access to mobility data with such fine-grained location
information, but only geo-coordinates (latitude and longitude). In
this subsection, we investigate whether our inference attack is still
effective in this situation.
To proceed, we partition the region covered by each city into
geo-grids, and assign a check-in into a grid if its geo-coordinates lie
in the grid. In our experiments, we have tried multiple granularity
for partitioning, including 0.0005°, 0.001°, 0.01°and 0.1° (similarly to
the partitioning used in [10]). Results are presented in Figure 5c.
At the finest granularity, i.e., 0.0005° (around 50m by 50m), our
inference attack achieves similar results as the case of POIs.10 We
have AUC equal to 0.80 in Los Angeles, 0.79 in New York and 0.75
in London. With geo-grids being coarser-grained, the AUC values
decrease monotonically. However, even when the adversary only
has the geo-coordinates at the granularity of 0.01° (around 1km
by 1km), our inference algorithm still performs quite well. More
interestingly, at the coarsest granularity, the AUC value is around
0.7 in Los Angeles, while the results are much worse in New York
and London. This can be explained by different location densities
in different cities. Locations in Los Angeles are more uniformly
distributed in the geo-space and distant from each other than those
in the other two cities. In conclusion, our attack is also effective
when fine-grained location information is not available, which
further demonstrates the generality of our approach.
5 COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we present three obfuscation mechanisms for en-
hancing users’ social relationship privacy while preserving the
check-in dataset’s utility as much as possible. The three mecha-
nisms, namely hiding, replacement and generalization, are based
on well-founded obfuscation schemes proposed by the research
community [6, 38] for protecting users’ location privacy. We ex-
tend them here to protect users’ social link privacy. Since these
defense mechanisms are not specific to a certain inference attack,
we evaluate them not only on our attack but also on baseline models
introduced in Section 4.
We first describe the utility metric considered in our defense,
then present the obfuscation mechanisms in detail and, finally, we
experimentally study the performance of our defense.
5.1 Utility Metric
One approach to quantify utility is to consider the global properties
of the obfuscated dataset, such as the check-in distribution over
all locations in each city. However, metrics of this kind neglect the
individual check-in behavior, and could lead to obfuscated datasets
becoming useless for a handful of applications, such as location rec-
ommendation [14, 33]. For keeping as much user utility as possible,
we design a metric which aims at measuring to what extent each
user’s check-in distribution is preserved.
We first denote a user u’s check-in distribution in the original
dataset as Pou (A) where A is the random variable to represent loca-
tions a user has visited. Formally,
Pou (A = ℓ) =
{ |τ (u, ℓ) |
|τ (u) | if ℓ ∈ ω(u),
0 otherwise.
(9)
Accordingly, u’s check-in distribution in the dataset obfuscated by
a certain defense mechanism b is defined as Pbu (A) and Pbu (A = ℓ) =
10Note that there are already multiple POIs mapped to one single grid with 0.0005°,
including POIs at the same latitude-longitude position but different height (e.g., in a
building).
|τ b (u, ℓ) |
|τ b (u) | for ℓ ∈ ωb (u). Here, τb (u, ℓ), τb (u) and ωb (u) denote u’s
check-ins at ℓ, u’s check-ins and the set of unique locations he has
visited in the obfuscated dataset, respectively. Then, u’s utility loss
is defined as the statistical distance between Pou (A) and Pbu (A). In
this work, we adopt Jensen-Shannon divergence as the statistical
distance. Formally, u’s utility loss is defined as
ϕb (u) =
∑
ℓ∈L
Pou (A = ℓ) log2
Pou (A = ℓ)
Mu (A = ℓ)+
Pbu (A = ℓ) log2
Pbu (A = ℓ)
Mu (A = ℓ) ,
(10)
where Mu (A = ℓ) = P
o
u (A=ℓ)+Pbu (A=ℓ)
2 . We use Jensen-Shannon
divergence since it satisfies the symmetry property of a distance
metric (contrary to the Kullback-Leibler divergence), and has been
used in previous works such as [27]. Moreover, Jensen-Shannon
divergence lies in the range between 0 and 1 which allows us to
easily define utility from the Jensen-Shannon divergence as follows:
ψb (u) = 1 − ϕb (u). (11)
In the end, the utility of the whole dataset after applyingb is defined
as the average utility loss over all users
Ψb =
∑
u ∈U
ψb (u)
|U| . (12)
5.2 Obfuscation Mechanisms
We now introduce the three obfuscation mechanisms for protecting
social link privacy.
Hiding. This mechanism simply removes a certain proportion of
check-ins in the original dataset. The check-ins to be removed
are randomly sampled and the remaining check-ins are used to
calculate the utility following the previous definition.
Replacement. This mechanism replaces a certain proportion of
check-ins’ locations with other locations to mislead the adversary.
A location in a certain check-in can be replaced by any location in
the dataset. In order to retain as much utility as possible, we adopt
the random walk approach proposed by Mittal et al. [27] to find
locations close to the original ones from a social mobility point of
view. For each check-in ⟨u, t , ℓ⟩ chosen to be replaced, we perform
a random walk from u on the bipartite graph G and replace the
location of the check-in with the last node in the randomwalk trace.
Since G is bipartite, the length of the random walk trace, another
hyperparameter, needs to be odd such that the random walk stops
at a location (not at a user). We empirically study how its length
affects the performance of replacement with respect to inference
performance and utility in the evaluation subsection.
It is worth noting that random walk used here has a different
purpose from the random walk used in the first stage of our infer-
ence attack (Section 3). The latter aims to reorganize G into random
walk traces for skip-gram to learn each user’s mobility features,
while the former utilizes the graph structure to find close locations
in order to keep the utility of the obfuscated dataset.
Generalization. As presented in Section 4, for each location, we
have its category information (collected from Foursquare) and geo-
coordinates, i.e., latitude and longitude. Our third defense mech-
anism aims at generalizing both the semantic and geographical
dimensions.
Foursquare organizes its location categories11 into a two-level
tree structure: 9 high-level categories and 427 low-level categories.12
Therefore, for semantic generalization, we logically rely on the two-
category levels provided by Foursquare. For geographical general-
ization, we partition check-ins into geographic grids of different
granularity (as in Section 4.5). Here, we also consider two-level
generalization: 0.01° (around 1 km by 1 km) grids for low-level gen-
eralization, and 0.1° (around 10 km by 10 km) grids for high-level
generalization.We consider 0.01° as low-level generalization and not
0.001° since, as shown in Figure 5c, the inference performance with
0.001° grids is almost as good as for the original attack. As in [6], ge-
ographic and semantic generalizations are considered jointly, which
gives us four different combinations of generalization, denoted by
lg-ls (low-level geo-grid, low-level semantics), lg-hs (low-level geo-
grid, high-level semantics), hg-ls (high-level geo-grid, low-level
semantics) and hg-hs (high-level geo-grid, high-level semantics).
Different from hiding and replacement, the generalization mech-
anism will modify the original set of locations (IDs) in the dataset
by merging multiple locations belonging to the same generalized
location together. However, when the adversary obtains the general-
ized dataset, he can use external knowledge to map the generalized
locations back to the original ones, and thereby increase the in-
ference performance or utility provided to the user, respectively.
For instance, MoMA and Bernarducci Meisel Gallery in New York
are generalized into the same location under lg-hs, i.e., art and
entertainment place at geographic coordinates (40.76° N, -73.97°
W). When a user shares a check-in at this generalized location, the
attacker or service provider is more confident that the check-in is
at MoMA than at Bernarducci Meisel Gallery, since the former is
much more popular than the latter.
In order to get conservative privacy guarantees for the general-
ization mechanism, we assume the adversary and service provider
to be equipped with such external knowledge. Practically, we con-
struct the adversary’s background knowledge by collecting each
location’s total number of check-ins from Foursquare’s API (in-
dependently from the Instagram data). For each check-in shared
at a generalized location, we sample a location that is included in
this generalized location as the check-in’s original location with a
sampling rate equal to the proportion of check-ins at this original
location in the generalized location area. 13
5.3 Defense Evaluation
We evaluate all the three obfuscation mechanisms against our infer-
ence attack as well as baseline models. Both hiding and replacement
mechanisms involve randomly obfuscating a certain proportion of
check-ins in the original dataset. In our experiments, we choose to
11https://developer.foursquare.com/categorytree
12This number is based on the result given by Foursquare’s API in January 2016
13We do not consider external knowledge in Section 4.5 since we want to evaluate
the performance of our attack. In that case, a simple adversary is a reasonable choice.
On the other hand, for evaluating the generalization mechanism and get safe privacy
guarantees, it is necessary to consider a stronger adversary with external knowledge.
hide or replace from 10% to 90% check-ins in incremental steps of
10%. For presentation purposes, we only depict the results for New
York, results for Los Angeles and London following a similar trend
and being presented in Appendix A.2.
Figure 6a presents our inference attack’s performance against
hiding and replacement. We observe that replacement is more effec-
tive than hiding on decreasing our inference attack’s performance
when the proportion of obfuscated check-ins is fixed. For instance,
when obfuscating 30% of check-ins, replacement decreases our at-
tack’s AUC by 7% while hiding only decreases it by 3%. Moreover,
in order to degrade the inference performance sufficiently to make
a poor prediction (AUC < 0.7), we need to hide 80% of the check-ins
or replace 50% of them. This is due to the fact that the replacement
mechanism introduces more noise to the original dataset than ran-
domly hiding check-ins, which will result in skip-gram learning
less informative features for each user. However, as hiding does not
cause significant changes to a user’s mobility distribution, it pre-
serves more utility than replacement for a fixel level of obfuscation
(Figure 6b). This demonstrates that there exists a tension between
privacy and utility in social link privacy protection, and that there
is no free lunch in such a setting.
We empirically evaluate the impact of the number of steps con-
sidered in the random walk for the replacement mechanism. Our
experiments show that increasing the steps from 5 to 15 decreases
attack performance quite significantly (Figure 6a), but that further
step increase does not provide much more privacy to the users
(as the AUC value then saturates for all obfuscation proportions).
The same decreasing behavior holds for utility, but the difference
is much smaller between 5 steps and 15, 25 and 35 steps than for
the AUC value decrease. By further taking into account the com-
putational time (bigger walk steps leads to longer execution time),
we believe that 15 provides the best trade-off between privacy,
utility, and efficiency for the replacement mechanism. Figure 6c
further shows AUC for hiding and replacement against the three
best performing baseline models, i.e., w_common_p, common_p and
overlap_p. As for our attack, replacement is more effective than
hiding on decreasing the AUC of the baselines for all proportions
of obfuscation except 90%.
Table 2 presents the AUC values and utility of the generalization
mechanism (for our attack and the three best baselines). First, we
observe that higher-level generalization leads to the worst inference
performance, thus best privacy provision, as expected. However,
we also notice that utility is decreased a lot with this countermea-
sure, down to 0.06 for maximal generalization. Interestingly, the
lowest-level generalization, i.e., lg-ls, is not very helpful for social
link privacy (AUC = 0.77 compared to AUC = 0.79 without counter-
measure) for a utility decrease that is still substantial. This indicates
that generalization does not provide an optimal balance between
utility and privacy. This is essentially due to the fact that the ex-
ternal knowledge (about location popularity) helps the adversary
improve his inference attack in presence of this countermeasure.
Second, lg-hs provides a better inference performance and utility
than hg-ls, which means that getting more precise geo-coordinates
is more informative about social relationships than having more
precise semantic information. Nevertheless, by comparing results
from Figure 5c in Section 4.5 to those reported here, we clearly
observe that semantic information brings a lot of information to the
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Figure 6: Hiding vs. replacement with respect to the proportion of obfuscation: (a) inference performance (AUC) of our at-
tack, (b) utility, and (c) inference performance (AUC) of baseline models in New York. The length of random walk steps in
replacement is set to 15 for baseline models, h represents hiding and r stands for replacement.
adversary (as shown in [2] for location inference). Indeed, we notice
that the AUC here with hg-hs is equal to 0.67 whereas it is equal to
around 0.6 in Figure 5c with similiar geographic information but no
semantics. Hence, we see that even high-level semantic information
brings sufficient knowledge to increase the attack’s AUC by 12%.
Lower-level semantic data increases it by 22% to 0.73.
We further calculate the adversary’s recovery rate, i.e., the pro-
portion of original check-ins that are recovered. The results are
presented in Table 2 too. As we can see, when the generalization
level is lg-ls, the adversary is able to recover 52% of the original
location IDs. Given that we only use a very simple recovery al-
gorithm based on the global locations’ distribution, this confirms
that generalization is not enough to protect location and social link
privacy against adversaries with external knowledge. Moreover,
lg-hs has a higher location recovery rate than hg-ls (23% vs. 14%),
which also explains why the attacker achieves a higher AUC in
lg-hs than in hg-ls.
Table 2: Inference performance and utility for generaliza-
tion in New York.
AUC Utility Recovery rate
ls hs ls hs ls hs
lg 0.77 0.75 0.57 0.30 52% 23%
hg 0.73 0.67 0.20 0.06 14% 2%
w_common_p overlap_p common_p
ls hs ls hs ls hs
lg 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.64
hg 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.62 0.58
When comparing the three obfuscation mechanisms by fixing
the AUC value (with our inference attack), hiding and replacement
achieve a comparable performance in general, and they both outper-
form generalization (Figure 7). For instance, if we want to achieve a
utility of at least 0.6, then the AUC values of hiding and replacement
are very close to each other, of 0.66 and 0.67, respectively. However,
we observe that, for a similar AUC value, utility drops to 0.06 with
the generalization mechanism. From Figure 7, it seems that hiding
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Figure 7: AUC vs. utility for three obfuscation mechanisms.
performs better than replacement. But we should also notice that
replacement can decrease inference attack’s performance, thus im-
prove privacy, to a larger extent than hiding: when obfuscating 90%
check-ins, replacement decreases our attack’s AUC to 0.54, while
hiding only leads to a minimal AUC of 0.59.
6 RELATEDWORK
With the increasing usage of portable devices, a large amount of
mobility data has become available. On the one hand, this repre-
sents an unprecedented chance to study the interaction between
human mobility and social networks. On the other hand, it raises
new concerns towards privacy. In the following, we separate the
most related literature into two main research topics. The first
line of research concentrates on inferring hidden location informa-
tion from social data while the second line focuses on leveraging
mobility data to infer social relationships.
Backstrom et al. [4] develop a maximal likelihood estimator to
predict a user’s undisclosed home location with his friends’ data.
Experiments on a large Facebook dataset show that their model out-
performs traditional IP-based approaches significantly. Following
this work, the authors of [23] have incorporated fine-grained social
relation information into their home location prediction model.
Evaluation on a Twitter dataset has demonstrated that social fea-
tures such as number of followers indeed increase the prediction
performance. Cho et al. [9] have observed on a Gowalla dataset that
a user’s mobility is centered around two states: home and work.
They develop a Gaussian mixture model to learn the two hidden
states and further incorporate friendship influence. Extensive exper-
iments demonstrate the effectiveness of their approach. Recently,
Olteanu et al. [30] have shown how co-location information about
OSN users (e.g., via location check-ins with two or more users)
can be used by an attacker to degrade these users’ location privacy.
They provide an analytical framework based on Bayesian networks
to formally quantify the effects of co-location data on location pri-
vacy and also consider the impact of some obfuscation mechanisms.
Other interesting works in this direction include [17, 18, 31, 36, 43].
The second line of research tackles the dual problem, i.e., using
mobility data to infer the underlying social relations. Our inference
attack and the baseline models [35, 37, 42] we compare it to fall
into this topic. Eagle et al. [13] have first shown that there exist
correlations between people’s co-occurrences and their social con-
nections by conducting a study based on mobile phone records.
Crandall et al. [10] go one step beyond by relying on a Bayesian
model to show that the friendship probability of two users with
joint mobility behavior is 5,000 times higher than those without
joint behavior. These results shed light on the social relation pri-
vacy threat carried by mobility data. However, the model they use
makes an over-simplified assumption that each user only has one
friend.
Scellato et al. [37] tried to get closer to a realisitic setting by
proposing 15 novel machine learning features. Among the 15 fea-
tures, 4 of them follow a classical link prediction setting [20] by
relying on some existing social network structure. In our work,
we assume that our adversary has no knowledge of any existing
social links. Besides, we evaluate all the other 11 features as part
of the baseline models. Moreover, their evaluation is conducted on
some predefined inference spaces such as two users need to share
common friends or common locations. In our experiments, we do
not impose any constraint on the mobility profiles of users, and
thus make a more realistic evaluation of these baseline models and
our inference attack.
Pham et al. [35] propose two features for social link inference,
i.e., diversity and w_frequency. The former concentrates on
the diversity of two users’ joint check-in behaviors and the lat-
ter reflects the popularity of two users’ common locations. Both
diversity and w_frequency are based on entropy measures. The
authors of [42] propose three mobility factors, namely personal,
global and temporal, Among them, the global factor is the same as
w_frequency in [35], while the personal factor (personal) follows
the intuition that two users are more likely to know each other if
they meet at locations they do not visit frequently.
Different from [37], both [35] and [42] consider two users’ meet-
ing events (visiting the same location at roughly the same time)
instead of common locations. However, meeting events are really
rare even in our large dataset, meaning that the methods in [35]
and [42] can only apply to a small set of users. Even when we con-
centrate on users with meeting events, features in [35] and [42] do
not achieve any performance gain compared to the case of common
locations, especially for personal in [42], where the performance
even worsens. Therefore, we decide to use common locations as
in [37] instead of meeting events to evaluate the baselines in [35]
and [42].14 As shown in Section 4, our inference attack significantly
outperforms these baselines, which demonstrates the effectiveness
and relevance of our approach.
7 CONCLUSION
Mobility data are nowadays largely available to a wide range of
service providers. This raises many privacy issues, especially when
such providers’ data ends up into the hands of intelligence agencies.
This paper aims at evaluating, with a principled approach, the im-
pact on social link privacy of this wide availability of location data.
To this endeavor, we propose a new generic method for inferring
social links without imposing any prior condition on users’ mobility
patterns. Furthermore, we design countermeasures for mitigating
the extent of the privacy threat towards social relationships.
The empirical evaluation of our inference attack demonstrates
that our principled approach outperforms previously proposed
inference algorithms by up to 20% on a large-scale dataset, with an
area under the ROC curve of around 0.8. Our results further show
that our attack provides fair prediction results (AUC equal to 0.71
or 0.75 depending on the targeted city) even when the number of
available location points per user is small (down to 5). Moreover,
our attack is quite robust to a low number of common locations
between two users. For two cities, it even provides fair prediction
performance (AUC around 0.72) when two users share no location
at all in common. Finally, we observe that our attack performs also
well with geographic grids of size up to 1-by-1 km instead of exact
semantic and geographic location data.
In order to counter the presented attack against social link
privacy, we propose and evaluate three well-established privacy-
preserving techniques: hiding, replacement and generalization. Our
empirical results demonstrate that, in order to degrade the inference
performance sufficiently to make a poor prediction (AUC smaller
than 0.7), we need to hide 80% of the location points or replace 50%
of them. However, we notice also that replacement decreases utility
more than hiding, which shows that there is no free lunch in such
a privacy setting. Furthermore, we notice that the generalization
mechanism provides a much poorer privacy-utility trade-off than
the hiding and replacement techniques. Finally, by comparing our
defense and attack results, we observe that the semantic dimen-
sion of locations can have substantial positive effect on the social
link inference when geographic information is obfuscated with
generalization.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Pairwise Similarity Measurements
We present the formal definitions of the 7 pairwise similarity mea-
surements used in our evaluation.
Cosine similarity.
s(θ (u),θ (u ′)) = θ (u) · θ (u
′)
| |θ (u)| |2 | |θ (u ′)| |2
Euclidean distance.
s(θ (u),θ (u ′)) = | |θ (u) − θ (u ′)| |2
Correlation coefficient.
s(θ (u),θ (u ′)) = (θ (u) − θ (u)) · (θ (u
′) − θ (u ′))
| |θ (u) − θ (u)| |2 | |θ (u ′) − θ (u ′)| |2
Here, θ (u) represents the mean value of θ (u).
Chebyshev distance.
s(θ (u),θ (u ′)) = dmax
i=1
|θ (u)i − θ (u ′)i |
Here, θ (u)i represents the ith element in θ (u).
Bray-Curtis distance.
s(θ (u),θ (u ′)) =
∑d
i=1 |θ (u)i − θ (u ′)i |∑d
i=1 |θ (u)i + θ (u ′)i |
Canberra distance.
s(θ (u),θ (u ′)) =
d∑
i=1
|θ (u)i − θ (u ′)i |
|θ (u)i | + |θ (u ′)i |
Manhattan distance.
s(θ (u),θ (u ′)) =
d∑
i=1
|θ (u)i − θ (u ′)i |
A.2 Defense Evaluation for Los Angeles and
London
The defense evaluation results for Los Angeles and London are
presented as the following.
Table 3: Inference performance and utility for generaliza-
tion in Los Angeles.
AUC Utility Recovery rate
ls hs ls hs ls hs
lg 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.48 74% 40%
hg 0.77 0.74 0.37 0.13 29% 7%
w_common_p overlap_p common_p
ls hs ls hs ls hs
lg 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.68 0.67
hg 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.64
Table 4: Inference performance and utility for generaliza-
tion in London.
AUC Utility Recovery rate
ls hs ls hs ls hs
lg 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.43 68% 36%
hg 0.71 0.66 0.28 0.08 21% 4%
w_common_p overlap_p common_p
ls hs ls hs ls hs
lg 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.65 0.63
hg 0.63 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.62 0.59
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Figure 8: Hiding vs. replacement with respect to (a) inference performance on our attack, (b) utility and (c) inference per-
formance on baseline models in Los Angeles. The length of random walk steps in replacement is 15 for baseline models, h
represents hiding and r represents replacement.
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Figure 9: Hiding vs. replacement with respect to (a) inference performance on our attack, (b) utility and (c) inference perfor-
mance on baseline models in London. The length of randomwalk steps in replacement is 15 for baseline models, h represents
hiding and r represents replacement.
